All work

Evaluating a New Market: Clinical Trial Diversity Recruitment Through Culturally-Tailored Engagement

Led a strategic market evaluation for extending a culturally-tailored engagement platform into clinical trial diversity recruitment and adherence. Applied rigorous business strategy frameworks to evaluate four product concepts across the patient journey, identified the highest-impact entry point, and developed a go-to-market strategy with a major healthcare innovation partner.

Role

VP of Product

Company

SameSky Health (health equity engagement platform)

Timeline

2023

Collaboration

Innovation arm of a Fortune 10 healthcare company (co-evaluation partner)

Scope

Market analysis, competitive landscape, intervention mapping, business modeling, go-to-market strategy, firsthand user research

Market Analysis Strategic Product Planning Design Thinking Health Equity Clinical Trial Operations Business Modeling

4

Product concepts evaluated

3

Strategic frameworks applied

Ph 3-4

Target trial phases identified

5+

NIH protocols completed

01

Context

By 2023, SameSky Health had proven its culturally-tailored engagement model in the health plan market, reaching 2.8 million members across 15 states with measurable lifts in HEDIS quality scores and Annual Wellness Visit completion. The question facing the product team was whether the same capabilities that made us effective at reaching underserved health plan members (multilingual outreach, cultural tailoring, behavioral engagement, community-based trust) could create value in adjacent markets.

Clinical trial diversity recruitment was a natural candidate. The industry had a well-documented problem: clinical trials in the US consistently under-represent minority populations. This isn't just a health equity issue; it's a scientific validity issue. Drugs and treatments are approved based on data that doesn't reflect the full population of people who will actually use them. The most under-represented populations are the elderly, women of child-bearing age, and ethnic minorities. The FDA has increasingly pressured sponsors to improve diversity in trial enrollment, and several large pharmaceutical companies had begun investing in diversity recruitment solutions. However, most of those solutions were technology-first approaches that didn't address the deeper structural barriers.

I was asked to help evaluate whether SameSky should enter this market and, if so, where we had a differentiated ability to win.

02

The Real Question

The surface question was "should we build a clinical trial recruitment product?" But the real question was more nuanced: at which points in the clinical trial patient journey could our specific capabilities create value that existing solutions could not?

Clinical trial participation isn't a single moment. It's a journey with at least four distinct stages, each with its own barriers:

Recruitment

Finding eligible patients and getting them to consider participating.


Informed consent

Helping patients understand what they're agreeing to.


Enrollment and adherence

Supporting patients through the protocol (visits, specimen collection, follow-up requirements).


Completion and retention

Keeping patients engaged through the full trial duration.

Most diversity recruitment solutions focused on the first stage (finding patients). Very few addressed why diverse patients drop out of the process at every subsequent stage. Dropouts get most costly at each progressive stage due to losing the sunk cost and time.

03

The Strategic Analysis

Working Backwards: Starting from the Patient

Amazon's Working Backwards methodology frames the opportunity from the patient's perspective before evaluating business viability. Step 1 is writing a press release for the product we would build, describing the benefit to the end user (the patient), not the buyer (the trial sponsor).

This exercise immediately clarified that the most impactful intervention wasn't recruitment. It was everything that happened after recruitment: the informed consent experience, the logistical barriers to participation, and the support infrastructure during the trial. Part of the solution is finding new ways to ask patients to participate, but the market was actually full of solutions for that problem as it has heavy overlap with the advertising and personalized marketing space. Diverse patients don't fail to enroll because nobody asked them. They fail to enroll because the process is inaccessible, the trust isn't there, and the support system assumes a patient profile that doesn't match their reality.

Key Insight

The Working Backwards exercise revealed that recruitment was the most crowded and least differentiated intervention point. The real opportunity was downstream: informed consent, logistical support, and adherence, where the barriers are structural and the existing solutions were weakest.

7 Powers: Where Could SameSky Win?

Applying Hamilton Helmer's 7 Powers framework helped evaluate whether SameSky had a defensible competitive advantage in this market:

Counter-positioning

Most clinical trial recruitment companies were technology platforms (databases, matching algorithms, digital advertising). SameSky's model combined technology with cultural competence, community relationships, and human engagement. Incumbents would have to fundamentally restructure their approach to match this, which they were unlikely to do because it would undermine their existing business model of low-cost, high-volume digital outreach.


Cornered resource

SameSky's CultureGuide platform and the cultural research it contained represented a unique asset. No other company had built a comparable depth of culturally-segmented engagement data across underserved populations. This data and the research methodology behind it would be extremely difficult to replicate.


Switching costs

Once a trial sponsor integrated culturally-tailored engagement into their recruitment and retention workflow, the operational investment in training, workflow adaptation, and relationship building would make switching costly.

The analysis confirmed that SameSky had a defensible position (assuming the joint entry with our proposed partner), but only if we entered at the right point in the patient journey.

Strategyzer Business Model Canvas and Innovation Tools

I used the Strategyzer Business Model Canvas to map the full business model for each of the four product concepts I was evaluating. This included value proposition design, customer segment analysis, channel strategy, revenue model, key partnerships, and cost structure. I also used Strategyzer's Value Proposition Canvas to ensure that each concept addressed a real job-to-be-done for the patient (not just the trial sponsor) and mapped the gains and pains specific to underserved populations.

Unit Economics Insight

The business model analysis revealed that recruitment-focused models competed on cost-per-enrolled-patient, a commoditized metric where our higher-touch approach would look expensive. Retention and adherence models could be priced against the cost of a failed trial (tens of millions of dollars in lost investment), making the unit economics far more favorable.

04

The Four Product Concepts

The analysis produced four distinct intervention concepts, each mapped to a stage of the patient journey:

1

Informed Consent Redesign

Consent stage

Redesigning consent documents using the same principles we applied to health engagement content: plain language, visual aids, progressive disclosure, and multilingual presentation that wasn't just translation but cultural adaptation. The goal was to make consent genuinely informed, not just legally compliant.

2

Community-Based Recruitment

Recruitment stage

Leveraging partnerships with trusted local institutions: community health centers, food pantries, shelters, churches, and community organizations. Trust is the primary barrier in underserved communities. The legacy of harm (Tuskegee, forced sterilizations, exploitative research) is real and present.

3

Logistical Support Network

Enrollment & adherence stage

Connecting participants with community resources to remove practical barriers to participation: transportation, childcare, time off work. These aren't trivial barriers for underserved populations, and trial sponsors rarely address them.

4

Digital Adherence Platform

Completion & retention stage

A support tool for enrolled participants: appointment reminders, symptom tracking, connection to study coordinators, and culturally-appropriate check-ins. The goal was to increase completion rates by providing the kind of ongoing support the trial infrastructure assumes but doesn't deliver for diverse participants.

05

The Recommendation

My analysis concluded that SameSky could not have much of a positive impact on Phase 1 and 2 clinical trials. Those trials are small, tightly controlled, often require extended inpatient stays, and operate within specialized clinical environments where our engagement model added limited value. These early-stage trials are often considered unsafe for the more vulnerable members of the population such as the elderly and women of child-bearing age, as the risks are just too high.

Phase 3 and 4 trials were a different story. These are large-scale protocols, often outpatient, with thousands of participants needed and retention rates that directly determine whether the trial succeeds or fails. They've already passed a minimum safety threshold and sometimes even already have approvals to be marketed to the general population. Our capabilities in culturally-tailored outreach, community-based trust building, logistical support coordination, and behavioral engagement mapped directly to the barriers that cause diverse participants to drop out of these larger trials.

The Strategic Recommendation

Enter clinical trial diversity through Phase 3 and 4 outpatient trials, focusing on retention and adherence rather than initial recruitment. The unit economics favored pricing against failed-trial costs rather than competing on cost-per-enrollment in a crowded recruitment market.

We were exploring a co-entry strategy with the innovation arm of a Fortune 10 healthcare company that had both the clinical trial sponsor relationships and the operational infrastructure to complement SameSky's engagement capabilities. We developed the joint go-to-market framework, but the partner ultimately decided not to proceed. SameSky would likely have moved forward based on my recommendations otherwise.

06

What I Learned as a Participant

As part of this initiative, I wanted to experience the clinical trial process firsthand. I signed up through the NIH Healthy Volunteers website and have since completed multiple clinical trial and research protocols at the National Institutes of Health.

This wasn't academic research. I went through the full patient experience: the recruitment and screening process, reading and signing informed consent documents, adhering to visit schedules and specimen collection protocols, interacting with research coordinators and clinical staff, and completing post-study follow-up. I experienced firsthand the friction points, communication gaps, and moments of confusion that our market research had identified from the outside.

Firsthand experience across the patient journey

Recruitment and screening process

Informed consent (reading, understanding, signing)

Protocol adherence (visit schedules, specimen collection)

Interacting with research coordinators and clinical staff

Post-study follow-up

Providing feedback on patient experience

My NIH research team regularly invites me back and has told me I'm one of their favorite participants because I provide detailed, constructive feedback on the patient experience of each study and offer ideas for improvement. This is essentially ongoing, self-directed user research in the clinical trials space. Every protocol I participate in deepens my understanding of where the process works, where it breaks down, and what a thoughtful product team could do about it.

Design Thinking, Taken to Its Logical Extreme

I didn't just research the user. I became the user. The firsthand experience transformed my understanding of the clinical trial patient journey in ways that no amount of secondary research could replicate.

07

What I Would Do Differently

I would have pushed harder to pursue the opportunity independently when the partner decided not to proceed. The market analysis was sound, the competitive positioning was strong, and the intervention points were clearly mapped. The partner's decision was driven by their own strategic priorities, not by a flaw in our business case. If I had framed the partnership as one possible channel rather than a prerequisite for market entry, we might have found an alternative path forward with a different channel partner.

I would also have started the NIH participation earlier. The firsthand experience transformed my understanding of the clinical trial patient journey in ways that no amount of secondary research could replicate. Beginning that immersion at the start of the market evaluation rather than midway through would have produced sharper insights from the beginning.

This case study describes strategic analysis methodology and product concepts. The co-evaluation partner is not identified. Market sizing data, competitive analysis details, and proprietary business models have been excluded. Strategic frameworks, intervention mapping, and firsthand participant experience are available for discussion in interviews.

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